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ABSTRACT—Congress recently instructed the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to investigate stratospheric aerosols, 
materials that could be injected in the atmosphere as a means of solar climate 
intervention. This action has been widely interpreted as the first-ever federal 
research project into solar geoengineering—proposals to slightly “dim the 
sun” to limit the harms of climate change. This Essay argues that NOAA 
should use its discretion to conduct a programmatic environmental 
assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as an 
initial step in governing this research program. Federal research into solar 
geoengineering is an extraordinary and highly controversial policy. The 
agency should carefully consider the environmental, social, and political 
impacts that may come with this undertaking. Further, the public deserves 
an opportunity to weigh in on the matter and to be apprised of its potential 
benefits and risks. NEPA provides a rigorous framework for doing just that. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Solar geoengineering, first proposed nearly fifty years ago1 and 
seriously investigated by a small scientific community since the mid-2000s, 
has largely been sidelined from mainstream climate policy.2 The idea is 
outlandish: Solar geoengineers would limit the ravages of global warming 
by making the atmosphere more reflective, which would limit the amount of 
solar energy that enters our planet’s climate system and thus cool the planet 
off.3 Solar geoengineering could possibly be regional, with fleets of ships 
seeding bright, shiny cloud cover over parts of the ocean, cooling the air and 
waters below.4 Or it could be global, depositing reflective fine particles or 
gases high in the upper atmosphere, which would cool the entire planet for a 
time, much as some large volcanic eruptions have.5 Climate modeling has 
shown that these ideas, as strange as they seem, could work. Planetary-scale 
solar geoengineering would likely generate a rapid and substantial cooling 
effect at modest direct costs.6 
But solar geoengineering alone would be a clumsy and imperfect 
response to climate change. It would not remove climate pollution from the 
 
 1 See D. N. Bernstein, J. D. Neelin, Q. B. Li & D. Chen, Could Aerosol Emissions Be Used for 
Regional Heat Wave Mitigation?, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 6373, 6373 (2013) (citing 
MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BUDYKO, CLIMATE AND LIFE (1974)). 
 2 See Peter C. Frumhoff & Jennie C. Stephens, Towards Legitimacy of the Solar Geoengineering 
Research Enterprise, 376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Apr. 2, 2018, at 2–3. 
 3 See INT’L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 349–52 (2018) [hereinafter 
IPCC]. Solar geoengineering also includes proposals to thin cirrus clouds to allow greater escape of 
energy back into space, but reflectivity-enhancing interventions are better understood and more often 
discussed by researchers. See id. at 348 tbl.4.7. 
 4 See id. (describing marine cloud brightening). 
 5 See id. (describing stratospheric aerosol injection). 
 6 See id. at 348–49. 
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atmosphere, but merely mask its effects on temperature.7 Other climate 
harms, like ocean acidification, would therefore remain the same or worsen 
during deployment.8 It would also be temporary, lasting only a few years, 
and so it would need to be reapplied regularly to maintain its cooling effect.9 
Furthermore, it is unclear how global deployment would reverberate through 
natural systems, or how regional interventions could disturb weather and 
climate in other parts of the planet.10 This is why solar geoengineering could, 
at best, only complement efforts to zero out greenhouse gas emissions 
(“mitigation”). It can be no substitute. 
There are also serious concerns over political control.11 Who will run 
these research programs? Who will hold them accountable? Who will decide 
what the climate will be? And how will these decisions interact with other 
parts of climate policy? Some observers have concluded that it would be 
impossible to resolve these questions fairly, or that the uncertainties inherent 
in solar geoengineering are too great to allow research to go forward.12 Even 
research advocates largely agree that deploying these technologies would be 
far from ideal; it would be better to avoid research altogether and pursue 
mitigation and adaptation alone.13 
Or, perhaps, it would have been better: despite decades of warnings, 
mainstream climate policy has largely failed to “bend the curve” on global 
greenhouse gas emissions.14 It increasingly looks as though mitigation and 
adaptation efforts alone will be insufficient to avert severe and irreversible 
harm to the planet.15 Meanwhile, the effects of climate change have already 
begun to appear, and they are expected to worsen at an accelerating pace.16 
 
 7 See JESSE L. REYNOLDS, THE GOVERNANCE OF SOLAR GEOENGINEERING: MANAGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 24–27 (2019). 
 8 Id. 
 9 ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 29 
(2009). 
 10 REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 24–27. 
 11 Id. at 28–30. 
 12 See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 266–67, 
277–78 (2014). 
 13 See, e.g., A. Atiq Rahman, Paulo Artaxo, Asfawossen Asrat & Andy Parker, Developing Countries 
Must Lead on Solar Geoengineering Research, 556 NATURE 22, 23–24 (2018). 
 14 See William J. Ripple, Christopher Wolf, Thomas M. Newsome, Phoebe Barnard & William R. 
Moomaw, World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency, 70 BIOSCIENCE 8, 8 (2020) (open letter 
with more than 11,000 scientist signatories). 
 15 See Fred Pearce, Geoengineer the Planet? More Scientists Now Say It Must Be an Option, YALE 
ENV’T 360 (May 29, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/geoengineer-the-planet-more-scientists-now-
say-it-must-be-an-option [https://perma.cc/9SNJ-V8YN]. 
 16 See IPCC, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
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Amid failure and a looming sense of emergency, national governments 
are quietly beginning to launch research programs on solar geoengineering.17 
In December 2019, Congress appropriated $4 million to the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to research the impacts 
of stratospheric aerosols on climate.18 Congress instructed NOAA that the 
appropriation was for: 
modeling, assessments, and, as possible, initial observations and monitoring of 
stratospheric conditions and the Earth’s radiation budget, including the impact 
of the introduction of material into the stratosphere from changes in natural 
systems, increased air and space traffic, proposals to inject material to affect 
climate, and the assessment of solar climate interventions. Within these funds, 
the agreement further directs [NOAA’s Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Research (NOAA Research)] to improve the understanding of the impact of 
atmospheric aerosols on radiative forcing, as well as on the formation of clouds, 
precipitation, and extreme weather.19 
 
 17 See, e.g., Stuart McDill, ‘Cloud Brightening’ Experiment May Help Cool Great Barrier Reef, 
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020, 3:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-earth-day-reef-cooling/cloud-
brightening-experiment-may-help-cool-great-barrier-reef-idUSKCN2240ZC [https://perma.cc/T4W8-
AQXN] (describing Australian research on marine cloud brightening to slow coral bleaching on the Great 
Barrier Reef); Graham Readfearn, Coalition Backs ‘Cloud-Brightening’ Trial on Great Barrier Reef to 
Tackle Global Heating, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2020/jul/15/coalition-backs-cloud-brightening-trial-on-great-barrier-reef-to-tackle-global-
heating [https://perma.cc/A43F-6UAW]; James Temple, China Builds One of the World’s Largest 
Geoengineering Research Programs, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.technologyrev
iew.com/2017/08/02/4291/china-builds-one-of-the-worlds-largest-geoengineering-research-programs 
[https://perma.cc/7EZ8-5GRQ] (describing China’s program as “one of the largest federally funded 
geoengineering research programs in the world”). 
 18 See H. COMM. ON RULES, 116TH CONG., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MRS. 
LOWEY, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REGARDING H.R. 1158: 
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020, DIVISION B – COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND 
RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020 17–18 (Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter JOINT 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT], https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20191216/BILLS-116HR1158SA-
JES-DIVISION-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/V52N-UX8Q] (report accompanying congressional 
appropriations for fiscal year 2020 containing the relevant appropriation instructions to NOAA Research); 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, 133 Stat. 2317, 2390–91 (2019) (containing 
the total FY2020 appropriation to NOAA and instructing the agency to follow the specific program 
designations within the Joint Explanatory Statement); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., APPROPRIATIONS 
BILLS: WHAT IS REPORT LANGUAGE? 1 (2010) (explaining the legal relationship between enacted 
appropriations text and accompanying joint explanatory statements); Shuchi Talati, A Small Provision in 
the FY20 Spending Package Deserves a Much Bigger Discussion, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 
24, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/shuchi-talati/provision-in-fy20-spending-package-deserves-
bigger-discussion [https://perma.cc/7JEU-8QZJ]. 
 19 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18 (emphasis added). 
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The language is widely seen as the first federally funded and controlled 
initiative to investigate solar geoengineering.20 These instructions could be 
fulfilled—and likely will be—through modeling and passive observation of 
the stratosphere to learn how it responds to aerosols introduced by natural 
and anthropogenic sources.21 Scientists have long conducted research on 
these topics,22 but Congress explicitly linked the project to “the assessment 
of solar climate interventions” rather than conventional climate science.23 
The questions explored go to the heart of solar geoengineering research 
needs.24 Subsequent congressional reports on climate policy have also 
highlighted the need for research into solar geoengineering techniques, and 
subsequent appropriations will likely expand research funding for the 
program.25 In short, this is a geoengineering research program. 
These developments require concrete, practical thinking about 
geoengineering research governance. If solar geoengineering could indeed 
reduce some of the impacts of climate change, how should responsible 
research proceed? What risks—environmental, social, political—are 
involved in this research? How should those risks be managed? What tools 
are available to meet those goals? 
This Essay considers the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—
a federal law requiring that federal agencies conduct an environmental 
review of certain proposed actions—as a means of answering these 
 
 20 See James Temple, The US Government Has Approved Funds for Geoengineering Research, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/12/20/131449/the-us-government
-will-begin-to-fund-geoengineering-research [https://perma.cc/H5ST-K5KC]. 
 21 See Emily Pontecorvo, The Climate Policy Milestone That Was Buried in the 2020 Budget, GRIST 
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://grist.org/climate/the-climate-policy-milestone-that-was-buried-in-the-2020-budget 
[https://perma.cc/AP32-PZTP] (quoting a NOAA official on how the funds likely will be used). 
 22 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 573–75 (2013) [hereinafter 
IPCC, 2013] (summarizing the state of scientific knowledge on atmospheric aerosols and climate). 
 23 See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 18. 
 24 See Douglas G. MacMartin & Ben Kravitz, Mission-Driven Research for Stratospheric Aerosol 
Geoengineering, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1089, 1092 (2019) (identifying solar geoengineering 
research needs on “aerosol microphysics . . . , stratospheric mixing, stratospheric chemistry (principally 
ozone), aerosol radiative heating and its effects on water vapor concentrations and on stratospheric 
circulation, [and] the influence on cirrus”). 
 25 H. SELECT COMM. ON THE CLIMATE CRISIS, 116TH CONG., SOLVING THE CLIMATE CRISIS: THE 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR A CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY AND A HEALTHY, RESILIENT, AND JUST 
AMERICA 526 (2020) (calling on Congress “to establish a research program” on solar geoengineering); 
see also FY21 Budget Outlook: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, AM. INST. PHYSICS 
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2020/fy21-budget-outlook-national-oceanic-and-atmospheric-
administration [https://perma.cc/6A4J-2ZAW] (reporting that the U.S. House of Representatives enacted 
language that would increase the program’s budget to $9 million for fiscal year 2021). 
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questions.26 NEPA has substantial limitations for technological assessments, 
especially concerning their future speculative impacts on society.27 But in the 
right hands, NEPA can be a serviceable tool to consider the environmental 
and social risks of this early solar geoengineering research program, seek 
expert advice on governance, and engage and educate the public on 
research.28 
Specifically, NOAA should complete a programmatic environmental 
assessment (PEA) under NEPA on its research program on climate 
interventions.29 PEAs help agencies consider the potential aggregate 
environmental impacts of a group of interrelated federal actions. They are 
most useful in instances like this one, where the impact of any one proposed 
action (i.e., research activity) would be too small to warrant environmental 
review. NOAA’s PEA could consider the impact and significance of this 
federal research program, its relationship to other research activities on 
climate and solar geoengineering, and its potential impact on the physical 
environment. It could then be incorporated into a NEPA analysis of 
individual projects or experiments, all of which would otherwise evade 
environmental assessment entirely due to their de minimis impacts.30 A PEA 
would provide at least some acknowledgment, assessment, and ownership of 
the risks at hand. 
 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012). This Essay builds on an analysis published in a blog post on 
Legal Planet in February 2020. Charles Corbett, Maxing Out NEPA: Environmental Review of Early 
Solar Geoengineering Field Research, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 25, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/
2020/02/25/maxing-out-nepa-environmental-review-of-early-solar-geoengineering-field-research 
[https://perma.cc/64MT-4J52]. 
 27 See Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0: Revamping Our Approach to Emerging 
Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1334–38 (2011); see also, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL 
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS (2010) (high-level technological 
assessment of carbon dioxide removal and solar geoengineering technologies). 
 28 This Essay does not consider deployment governance or governance of large-scale research with 
significant environmental impacts because those questions are largely premature. Planned and foreseeable 
research would have a vanishingly small impact on the physical environment. See MacMartin & Kravitz, 
supra note 24, at 1089–90. 
 29 See Memorandum from Michael Boots, Council on Env’t Quality, to Heads of Fed. Dep’ts & 
Agencies on Effective Use of Programmatic NEPA Revs. (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/05/f31/effective_use_of_programmatic_nepa_reviews_18
dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNG7-YKQR] (providing an overview of NEPA and discussing the 
relationship between NEPA and PEAs). 
 30 See infra text accompanying notes 98–122. The proposed PEA is thus narrower, more focused on 
near-term research, and more in line with NOAA’s current NEPA practices than other geoengineering 
governance proposals that would make use of NEPA. Cf. Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of 
Geoengineering Research Governance, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2556–65 (2016) (discussing how 
environmental impact statements under NEPA “often overlook indirect, cumulative, or programmatic 
effects”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
246 
Admittedly, early-stage solar geoengineering research activities would 
have little impact on the physical environment—far below what normally 
triggers NEPA review.31 But the experiments would advance understanding 
of technologies that could alter the planet’s natural systems in ways 
unprecedented in terms of scale, impact, and intentionality. NEPA guidance 
makes it clear that “extraordinary” or “highly controversial” government 
actions call for a more searching review.32 This is the case here. Moreover, 
the public should be allowed to weigh in on this development and receive 
notice of the risks it entails. 
Furthermore, besides a handful of exceptions, solar geoengineering 
research has been limited to lab experiments and computer modeling by 
private research teams.33 A national government launching its own climate 
engineering “assessment” program raises the stakes. This seems especially 
so given the national government in question is the United States, one of the 
few countries that could plausibly spearhead global deployment of solar 
geoengineering. At the same time, other research institutions, such as 
Harvard University, are likely to go forward with their own field experiments 
on the subject.34 Some of these experiments could require federal approval35 
and investigate questions closely related to NOAA’s research objectives.36 A 
PEA would allow the U.S. government to simultaneously, and 
authoritatively, consider the impacts of all research activities potentially 
occurring under its jurisdiction. 
Ideally, Congress would lead public deliberation on solar 
geoengineering research by holding hearings and debating legislation, rather 
than leaving action to an administrative agency. Congress, however, as it so 
often does on environmental issues, short-circuited its deliberative processes 
and created this solar geoengineering research program through an obscure 
 
 31 See infra text accompanying notes 98–122. 
 32 See infra text accompanying notes 123–29. 
 33 See IPCC, supra note 3, at 351–52 (explaining that “global field experiments have not been 
conducted and most of the knowledge about SRM is based on imperfect model simulations and some 
natural analogues”). 
 34 See Framework, Deliverables, and Timeline, SCOPEX ADVISORY COMM., https://scopexac.
com/framework-deliverables-and-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/F4H5-88QQ]. 
 35 See id.; see also John A. Dykema, David W. Keith, James G. Anderson & Debra Weisenstein, 
Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment: A Small-Scale Experiment to Improve Understanding 
of the Risks of Solar Geoengineering, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Dec. 28, 2014, at 16 
(describing coordination with the FAA in the context of risk mitigation). 
 36 See 33 U.S.C. § 893(a)–(b) (NOAA Research’s organic statute); see also About the Climate 
Program Office, NOAA CLIMATE PROGRAM OFF., https://cpo.noaa.gov/Who-We-Are/About-CPO 
[https://perma.cc/LF57-J4M3]. 
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appropriation.37 The duty to facilitate public engagement hence falls to the 
agency tasked with carrying this research out. Legitimacy is one reason this 
public engagement is worthwhile: thoughtful and open consideration of a 
solar geoengineering research program, subject to judicial review, would 
better cement the government’s claim of authority to start one.38 Doing so 
would also satisfy NEPA’s core purpose, which is to spur ex ante 
consideration of the environmental risks of major federal actions.39 Solar 
geoengineering, if deployed, would have environmental impacts of a 
magnitude that few other human endeavors have matched. Surely this merits 
some environmental assessment at the outset. 
Part I discusses the relationship between solar geoengineering research 
and climate modeling. Part II then provides an overview of the NEPA 
process and the opportunities it provides for governing federal 
geoengineering research. Finally, Part III illustrates why an agency should 
want to use its discretion here to engage in expansive NEPA review. 
I. EARLY FIELD RESEARCH INTO SOLAR GEOENGINEERING 
Among solar geoengineering proposals, the best understood and most 
discussed is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), as considered in the 
appropriations language.40 A SAI program would introduce a thin “veil” of 
aerosols into the stratosphere that, while suspended there, would reflect away 
a small portion of incoming sunlight.41 Less solar energy would enter the 
planet’s climate system, causing it to cool. Large-scale deployment of SAI 
could deliver a substantial cooling effect, sustained for about a year or more 
 
 37 See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also Richard J. Lazarus, 
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 
632–33 (2006). 
 38 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1511, 1528–33, 1547–50 (1992); Tina Nabatchi, Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic 
Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 
376, 376–77 (2010). 
 39 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy 
Commission and other agencies to consider environmental issues just as they consider other matters 
within their mandates.”). 
 40 See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also IPCC, supra note 3, at 
348 tbl.4.7 (providing an overview of solar geoengineering technologies, including stratospheric aerosol 
injection (SAI)). 
 41 See, e.g., IPCC, supra note 3, at 349–52 cross-ch. box 10; Oliver Morton, Cutting Loose the 
Climate Future from the Carbon Past, ANTHROPOCENE (July 2017), https://www.anthropocenemagazine.
org/geoengineering [https://perma.cc/6DAT-8JSP]. 
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after injection, at relatively low direct costs.42 Yet much scientific uncertainty 
remains on the character, distribution, and controllability of SAI’s effects.43 
As with other areas of climate science, modeling is central to improving 
knowledge of SAI.44 Climate modeling is similar to weather forecasting but 
is concerned with much larger scales of space and time.45 Climate models 
use many lines of computer code to calculate past or future climate states 
based on the inputs and assumptions fed into them. These models are then 
used to study the climate system, the natural and human processes that 
influence it, how it might behave within different greenhouse gas emissions 
scenarios, and more. Current modeling shows that SAI is a technically 
feasible climate cooling mechanism.46 
Yet modeling has a few important limitations.47 First, models rely on 
scientific equations to represent the natural processes that drive climate. A 
climate model’s reliability will hence suffer where scientific understanding 
is wrong or especially incomplete.48 Second, climate models run on limited 
computing power. A computer can complete only so many calculations in a 
second, meaning scientists must simplify the world depicted in their 
models.49 Simplifications can help models incorporate parts of the climate 
system that are too complex, too small, or too poorly understood to reliably 
calculate. As said by one climate scientist: “Models are not right or wrong; 
they’re always wrong. They’re always approximations. The question you 
have to ask is whether a model tells you more information than you would 
have had otherwise.”50 
SAI modeling to date has used somewhat simple assumptions. For 
example, researchers have simulated SAI deployment by reducing the solar 
 
 42 See Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 1, 
2–3 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018). 
 43 See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1090, 1091 fig.2. 
 44 See id. at 1091–92. 
 45 Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, CARBONBRIEF (Jan. 15, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.
carbonbrief.org/qa-how-do-climate-models-work [https://perma.cc/47JC-B8YP]. One way of defining 
“climate,” after all, is average weather over a given period. REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 8. 
 46 IPCC, supra note 3, at 348–49, 351–52. 
 47 See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45. 
 48 Cf. IPCC, 2013, supra note 22, at 743–45 (describing advances and limitations in climate 
modeling). 
 49 This can be done through “coarser” spatial resolutions or through larger time jumps between 
climate states. It is also done by using “parameterisations,” where a model uses fixed values to 
approximate certain phenomena rather than calculating them out. Examples of phenomena parameterized 
in models include scattering of sunlight by atmospheric aerosols, reflection and absorption of energy by 
clouds, and surface reflectivity. See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45. 
 50 Gavin Schmidt, The Emergent Patterns of Climate Change, TED (Mar. 2014), https://www.ted.
com/talks/gavin_schmidt_the_emergent_patterns_of_climate_change [https://perma.cc/5Q23-4U6A]. 
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input—turning down the sun, essentially—and seeing what happens.51 These 
findings should be treated as simple sketches of deployment, rather than 
accurate predictions. But “simple” does not mean bad or worthless. Climate 
models themselves began as somewhat limited analytical tools, gradually 
adding more complex interactions as scientific understanding grew and 
computing power improved.52 This progress has been essential to improving 
knowledge of the climate system and the impact of greenhouse gas emissions 
caused by humans.53 Furthermore, the projections of these climate models, 
starting in the 1970s, have proven generally accurate when compared to 
observational data collected later.54 
FIGURE 1: THE WORLD IN GLOBAL CLIMATE MODELS 
Fig. 1, showing the gradual evolution of climate models as they included 
more aspects of the climate system, beginning with CO2, solar energy, and rain, 
eventually adding land surfaces, ocean, sulfates, volcanic activity, clouds, 
aerosols, biogenic processes, and more.55 
 
 51 See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1091. 
 52 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 98 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, 
2007]; see also IPCC, 2013, supra note 22, at 743 (reporting continued improvements in climate 
modeling). 
 53 See IPCC, 2007, supra note 52, at 98. 
 54 See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45. 
 55 IPCC, 2007, supra note 52, at 99 fig.1.2. 
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Just as models improved climate depictions through “detailed 
laboratory measurements, observational experiments and theoretical 
analyses,” so too can they be improved for investigating SAI.56 Accordingly, 
initial field research into solar geoengineering would seek to answer basic 
questions of how the stratosphere behaves, how materials are distributed 
through it, and how stratospheric changes influence the troposphere below—
the turbulent layer of the atmosphere where weather happens and where we 
humans live.57 The data gathered would help improve models for depicting 
future climate change and hypothetical climate interventions. However, 
opposition to SAI and SAI-related research initiatives is not driven by harms 
to the physical environment; it is driven by concern over the potential social, 
political, and indirect consequences further down the road. 
Considering a real-world example may help clarify why this is the case 
and how this science works in practice. A team at Harvard University is 
developing an SAI field experiment called the Stratospheric Controlled 
Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx).58 SCoPEx aims to improve the 
understanding of SAI by studying how aerosols physically disperse when 
released into the stratosphere and the composition of their subsequent 
chemistry.59 To gather this data, SCoPEx will release a weather balloon into 
the upper atmosphere carrying a small array of observation equipment.60 
Upon reaching altitude, the balloon will spray a few kilograms of material—
water, calcium carbonate, and sulfates are candidates61—to observe their 
 
 56 Cf. id. at 98. 
 57 See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1091–92. 
 58 See Keutsch Rsch. Grp., Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx), HARV. U., 
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/keutschgroup/scopex [https://perma.cc/UPT9-PN2Z]. 
 59 See Dykema et al., supra note 35, at 5–6. 
 60 Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58. 
 61 Some readers may wonder why researchers are investigating sulfates as a potential chemical agent 
for SAI; the Clean Air Act regulates sulfur dioxide as a criteria pollutant, and scientists have long 
established the relationship between sulfur dioxide and acid rain, ozone layer depletion, and human 
respiratory problems. See Renee Rico, The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulfur Dioxide: An Update 
on Market Experience, 5 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 115, 116–17 (1995); Guy Brasseur & Claire Granier, 
Mount Pinatubo Aerosols, Chlorofluorocarbons, and Ozone Depletion, 257 SCIENCE 1239, 1239 (1992); 
see also Review of the Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides, 84 Fed. Reg. 
9866, 9874–75 (Mar. 18, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). But scientists have also long studied 
the cooling effect of atmospheric sulfates, such as the global cooling associated with large volcanic 
eruptions and the regional cooling from industrial emissions. See, e.g., Brasseur & Granier, supra, at 
1239; B. H. Samset, M. Sand, C. J. Smith, S. E. Bauer, P. M. Forster, J. S. Fuglestvedt, S. Osprey & C.-
F. Schleussner, Climate Impacts from a Removal of Anthropogenic Aerosol Emissions, 45 GEOPHYSICAL 
RSCH. LETTERS 1020, 1020, 1026 (2018). Further, scientists have a good understanding of how sulfates 
cycle through the atmosphere, soils, oceans, and ecosystems. See generally P. Brimblecombe, The Global 
Sulfur Cycle, in 10 TREATISE ON GEOCHEMISTRY 559 (David M. Karl & William H. Schlesinger eds., 2d 
ed. 2014) (summarizing the state of scientific knowledge on the sulfur cycle). Sulfur, fittingly, is the devil 
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behavior, chemistry, and influence on the surrounding light and air.62 These 
observations will help researchers improve modeling of ozone depletion, 
aerosol longevity, and more, which in turn will help models render more 
accurate depictions of SAI deployment.63 
 The opposition of some stakeholders to SCoPEx and similar field 
experiments has little to do with their direct impacts on the physical 
environment. If SCoPEx were to release sulfates, the amount of material 
released would be very small, much less than what a commercial airplane 
emits during “one minute of flight.”64 It would also be released at a very great 
height, meaning the material would wash out over a far greater space and 
become much more diluted by the time it reaches the surface as compared to 
industrial sources.65 If SCoPEx were to use sulfates, it would have no lasting 
or significant impact on the physical environment. 
Similar to the controversy over early research into genetically modified 
organisms, opponents’ concern is driven by potential consequences further 
down the road.66 Critics warn of a slippery slope, where early research would 
inexorably commit governments to bigger experiments, development of the 
technology, and, ultimately, deployment.67 They argue solar geoengineering 
could cause moral hazard, in that research would signal policymakers and 
business leaders to take emissions cuts even less seriously than they already 
do.68 Some consider it intrinsically wrong to tamper with nature this way, or 
that SAI’s deployment would be inevitably unjust, given its global impacts 
and centralized control.69 
 
we know. See REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 20. Some have proposed calcium carbonate as an alternative 
chemical for SAI deployment given sulfates’ health and environmental impacts. See David W. Keith, 
Debra K. Weisenstein, John A. Dykema & Frank N. Keutsch, Stratospheric Solar Geoengineering 
Without Ozone Loss, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 14910, 14910 (2016). 
 62 Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58. 
 63 See Dykema et al., supra note 35, at 6. 
 64 Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58. A kilogram or so is several orders of magnitude smaller than 
the emissions levels that harm human health and the environment. See EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE 
ASSESSMENT FOR SULFUR OXIDES – HEALTH CRITERIA 2-3 fig.2-1, 2-4 fig.2-2 (2017) (reporting 
hundreds of thousands of tons of sulfur dioxide emissions annually in the United States from fossil fuel 
combustion, concentrated in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic). 
 65 See Peter J. Irvine, Ben Kravitz, Mark G. Lawrence, Dieter Gerten, Cyril Caminade, Simon N. 
Gosling, Erica J. Hendy, Belay T. Kassie, W. Daniel Kissling, Helene Muri, Andreas Oschlies & Steven 
J. Smith, Towards a Comprehensive Climate Impacts Assessment of Solar Geoengineering, 5 EARTH’S 
FUTURE 93, 97 (2017). 
 66 See Stefan Schäfer & Sean Low, The Discursive Politics of Expertise: What Matters for 
Geoengineering Research and Governance?, in WORK IN PROGRESS: ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT IN 
THE HANDS OF EXPERTS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2) (Frank Trentmann, Anna Barbara Sum & 
Manuel Rivera eds., 2018). 
 67 See id.; see also ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing risk of technology “lock-in”). 
 68 ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 9, at 37. 
 69 See id. at 45. 
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Regardless of the specific activities NOAA Research plans to pursue, 
Congress’s appropriation is intended, in part, for the “assessment of solar 
climate interventions.”70 Research thus heads down this purportedly slippery, 
morally hazardous, intrinsically wrong path. The next step, then, is to ask 
what governance is appropriate in light of these serious concerns. 
II. NEPA: PURPOSE, DESIGN, AND LIMITATIONS 
The purpose of NEPA is to integrate environmental considerations into 
federal agency decision-making and to assure the public that the agency has 
considered those impacts.71 It does so by requiring federal agencies to 
describe and analyze the environmental impacts of proposed government 
actions.72 The bulk of impact analysis occurs through devising reasonable 
alternatives to the proposed action and comparing the environmental impacts 
between the different pathways. The agency must also describe the final 
action and explain why it was chosen. 
The Council of Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) implementing 
regulations for NEPA—and their interpretation by federal courts—have 
created an elaborate administrative scheme for NEPA’s implementation.73 A 
few key terms are below: 
• Environmental Assessment (EA): Environmental review document 
prepared if the agency is unsure whether the proposal has significant 
 
 70 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 18. 
 71 Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981). 
 72 Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 
46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,026–29 (Mar. 17, 1981) (describing requirements of the environmental review 
process), rescinded in part by National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable 
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,619–21 (Apr. 25, 1986) (striking instructions regarding worst-case 
scenario analysis). 
 73 CEQ promulgates regulations instructing federal agencies on how to complete environmental 
review processes that comply with NEPA. It has recently finalized revisions to NEPA’s implementing 
regulations. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020). Among other changes, it controversially 
limits which government actions trigger NEPA’s requirements, narrows the range of alternative actions 
agencies must consider, and expands the role of nongovernment project proponents in developing 
environmental analyses. See Rachael L. Lipinski, Jonathan D. Simon, Molly A. Lawrence & Joseph B. 
Nelson, CEQ Issues Final Rule to Modernize NEPA Regulations, NAT’L L. REV. (July 20, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ceq-issues-final-rule-to-modernize-nepa-regulations 
[https://perma.cc/K63G-M5D3]. Environmental groups quickly filed suit challenging the new 
implementing rules and seeking vacatur. See Nationwide Coalition Sues to Defend the People’s 
Environmental Law, EARTHJUSTICE (July 29, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2020/nationwide
-coalition-sues-to-defend-the-peoples-environmental-law [https://perma.cc/SH47-NMQJ]. Given 
litigation uncertainties and new priorities of the Biden administration, this Essay looks to both sets of 
regulations. See Kelsey Brugger, Biden CEQ Pick Signals NEPA Changes, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE 
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063721221 [https://perma.cc/R24K-7DPV]. 
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environmental impacts, or where a proposal without significant 
impacts is unusual or extraordinary;74 
• Environmental Impact Statement (EIS): In-depth environmental 
review document prepared if the agency determines the proposed 
action will have significant impacts;75 
• Programmatic NEPA Review (PEA or PEIS): A broad, high-level 
EA or EIS that examines the big picture environmental 
consequences of a policy, often covering many interrelated federal 
actions that may otherwise evade environmental review;76 and 
• Categorical Exclusion (CX): Frequent or routine agency action 
determined in advance to have no significant environmental impacts, 
therefore presenting no need to prepare an EA or an EIS.77 
Agencies retain discretion in how to structure their NEPA analyses’ 
scope, detail, and outcome, provided they take a “hard look” at the 
environmental consequences of their proposals.78 For NEPA, a “hard look” 
requires the agency to gather sufficient information about the proposal’s 
likely environmental impacts, weigh the risks and benefits in good faith, and 
explain the reasoning behind its final conclusion.79 Agencies also submit 
their analyses to a public notice and comment process, allowing for 
substantial input by interested members of the public.80 Courts will defer to 
those determinations so long as they find them complete and reasonable.81 If 
the court finds the analysis insufficient, though, it may remand the NEPA 
process back to the agency to correct the deficiency.82 It may also enjoin the 
proposed action in the meantime, depending on the circumstances of the 
case.83 
 
 74 See James W. Spensley, National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 681, 695–96 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 24th ed. 2019). 
 75 See id. at 696–706. 
 76 See Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 77 See Spensley, supra note 74, at 690–91. 
 78 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 
838 (1972)). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the cause of action and standard of 
review in NEPA cases. See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989); see also Citizens 
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–17 (1971) (elaborating on the requirements of 
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA). 
 79 Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 32; see also Forty Most Asked Questions 
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar. 
17, 1981). 
 80 COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: 
HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 25 (2007). 
 81 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412. 
 82 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 420–21 (clarifying the requirements of 
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA and providing a remedy). 
 83 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010). 
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NEPA is said to be procedural rather than substantive.84 It requires 
rigorous contemplation of environmental impacts but does not mandate an 
environmentally friendly final decision by the agency.85 NEPA does not 
require agencies to commit to mitigation plans to limit the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action.86 Further, agencies need only consider the 
reasonably foreseeable effects of their actions, not the related actions of 
others outside their control.87 Also excluded are psychological harms the 
proposal may cause, absent a direct connection to a significant physical 
change in the environment.88 Similarly, policy objections to a proposal or a 
proposal’s symbolic significance need not be analyzed.89 
Despite these constraints, NEPA has been successful at compelling 
agencies to produce thorough, thoughtful analyses of the environmental 
consequences of major government proposals.90 It also provides a forum for 
impacted communities to raise their concerns to the federal government with 
the assurance they will be heard.91 NEPA has been justifiably criticized for 
being overly burdensome at times, as in the context of analyses for some 
proposals by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD),92 but on the whole, NEPA has been rightfully credited with 
promoting a more cautious and conscientious attitude in government toward 
the environment.93 
III. IMPLEMENTING NEPA FOR SOLAR GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH 
Basic scientific research is often a poor fit for NEPA review because of 
its low physical impact on the environment, uncertain consequences, and 
available CXs. NOAA, however, retains discretion to engage in a more 
thorough environmental review in light of “extraordinary” or “highly 
 
 84 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
 85 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980). 
 86 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989). 
 87 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004). 
 88 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776–77 (1983). 
 89 See id. at 777 n.12. 
 90 See COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, LENGTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENTS (2013–2017) 1 (2019) [hereinafter CEQ] (reporting the average page length of 
environmental impact statements across agencies to be 669 pages and the median to be 445 pages). 
 91 Spensley, supra note 74, at 702. 
 92 See CEQ, supra note 90, at 6 fig.3 (showing HUD environmental impact statements more than 
double the page length of the average page length of statements across all agencies). 
 93 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s 
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (“NEPA is without question the most 
widely emulated of the major U.S. environmental laws . . . inspir[ing] . . . numerous progeny around the 
globe . . . .”). 
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controversial” activities.94 A PEA would be appropriate in anticipation of 
federal research on solar geoengineering given the profound risks and ethical 
issues it raises. 
A. Legal Bars to Compelling NEPA Review 
Scientific research tends to be characterized under NEPA as an activity 
that lacks environmental impacts. With NEPA, “Congress was talking about 
the physical environment—the world around us, so to speak.”95 NEPA thus 
requires a “reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the 
physical environment and the effect at issue” to compel environmental 
review.96 The results of scientific investigation are often uncertain, and even 
more unknown are the ways in which government actors and private parties 
might put that knowledge to use. As the National Science Foundation says 
in its implementing regulations for NEPA, “the long term effect of the 
accumulation of human knowledge is . . . basically speculative and 
unknowable in advance.”97 Basic scientific research therefore rarely 
produces the direct, physical environmental impacts typically analyzed 
under NEPA. 
The most pressing concerns regarding solar geoengineering research 
also rarely present a clear basis for triggering NEPA’s requirements. Worries 
about a “slippery slope,” for example, rely on a highly speculative causal 
relationship between research and deployment. A few hypotheticals show 
why: Imagine that an early, low-impact field experiment discovers that 
atmospheric heating associated with aerosol dispersion is far greater and far 
more uneven than once thought.98 Subsequent improved modeling based on 
this data shows this heating would, in a global SAI deployment scenario, 
likely cause long-term drought over major agricultural regions around the 
world. Such a discovery could very well kill enthusiasm for solar 
geoengineering leading to the idea’s abandonment and a lack of resulting 
physical impact. Not doing research, conversely, could conceal this 
drawback and needlessly preserve the threat of emergency SAI deployment. 
Alternatively, solar geoengineering field research could uncover no 
new drawbacks within climate modeling of deployment scenarios. Yet, 
future decision-makers may still find the unknowns of SAI too daunting, 
 
 94 See infra text accompanying notes 121–135. 
 95 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983). 
 96 Id. at 774. 
 97 45 C.F.R. § 640.3(b) (2019); see also Albert C. Lin, U.S. Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE 
LAW 154, 157–58 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018). 
 98 See OLIVER MORTON, THE PLANET REMADE: HOW GEOENGINEERING COULD CHANGE THE 
WORLD 111 (2015) (describing stratospheric heating). 
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preferring the dangers and diffuse accountability of a greenhouse Earth to a 
geoengineered one, again, producing no direct physical impact. Or more 
optimistically, aggressive efforts on climate mitigation, adaptation, and 
carbon removal could obviate the need to consider deploying SAI at all. 
NEPA requires a “reasonably close causal relationship” between 
proposed action and potential impact, akin to “proximate cause from tort 
law.”99 The chain of causation within slippery slope arguments assumes too 
much to meet that standard. It leaps from field research to modeling, to 
subsequent experimentation, to technological development, and, finally, to 
deployment, all against an assumed backdrop of worsening climate harms, 
lackluster mitigation, and high risk tolerance by political decision-makers. 
Any one of these assumptions may be plausible, but strung together, they 
make a future scenario too flimsy to compel NEPA review. 
Supposing for the sake of argument that the causal relationship is 
proximate, NOAA Research would still have no authority to deploy SAI and 
no power to stop others from doing so. Such third-party actions would be 
beyond NOAA Research’s jurisdiction and therefore beyond the scope of 
what the agency must consider in NEPA review.100 This is the same reason 
why moral hazard concerns on their own would not trigger NEPA review of 
solar geoengineering research. Moral hazard arguments warn that 
governments will delay mitigation and climate adaptation efforts out of the 
belief that solar geoengineering will sufficiently protect against climate 
risk.101 NOAA Research, however, has no authority to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions or lead adaptation efforts. It cannot delay what it cannot 
control, and it, therefore, need not analyze moral hazard risk. 
Left then to trigger NEPA review are the direct physical impacts of 
research. But the environmental impacts associated with current, planned, 
and foreseeable solar geoengineering research are minimal: a computer 
model running in a lab, a weather balloon released into the sky. The Supreme 
Court’s 1983 decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear 
Energy102 is on point here. At issue was the nuclear power plant on Three 
Mile Island, Pennsylvania, the very same plant where in 1979 a nuclear 
reactor appeared on the brink of a catastrophic meltdown and sparked a 
national panic.103 After the Three Mile Island incident, the Nuclear 
 
 99 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (citing Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 
774). 
 100 See id. 
 101 See Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 678 
(2013). 
 102 460 U.S. 766 (1983). 
 103 See N.Y. Times, Three Mile Island Documentary: Nuclear Power’s Promise and Peril, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0P9S4F4KpQ [https://perma.cc/48JA-9LPG]. 
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Regulatory Commission shut down all reactors at the plant and conducted a 
safety review.104 The Commission determined that a nuclear reactor not 
involved in the incident could resume operations; an EA accompanying the 
decision concluded no EIS was required.105 Antinuclear group, People 
Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), sued, arguing a supplemental EIS was 
required to assess the mental anguish and anxiety in surrounding 
communities over renewed fears of a nuclear meltdown.106 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, disagreed. The “risk of an 
accident is not an effect on the physical environment. A risk is, by definition, 
unrealized in the physical world.”107 The causal chain proposed by PANE—
resumption of plant operations, perception of risk, and experiencing 
psychological harm—therefore exceeded “the reach of NEPA.”108 Justice 
Rehnquist added: 
[T]he question whether the gains from any technological advance are worth its 
attendant risks may be an important public policy issue. Nonetheless, it is quite 
different from the question whether the same gains are worth a given level of 
alteration of our physical environment or depletion of our natural resources. The 
latter question rather than the former is the central concern of NEPA.109 
With this, Metropolitan Edison Co. pushes back against antinuclear activists’ 
use of NEPA litigation as a tactic to slow nuclear energy projects.110 It recalls 
the Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., also written by Justice Rehnquist, rejecting 
arguments for a more elaborate environmental review of a nuclear power 
plant.111 The Court viewed these claims as brought out of steadfast opposition 
to nuclear energy rather than genuine concern for environmental review:112 
“Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy . . . . The 
fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the 
state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts.”113 
NEPA processes are thus no place to derail Congress’s major policy 
 
 104 Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 769–70. 
 105 Id. at 770 n.4. 
 106 See id. at 771. 
 107 Id. at 775. 
 108 Id.; see also id. at 779 (Brennan, J., concurring) (adding psychological harm associated with 
“direct sensory impact of a change in the physical environment” would be “cognizable under NEPA”). 
 109 Id. at 776 (majority opinion). 
 110 See id. at 777 & n.12. 
 111  435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 112 See id. at 553–54. 
 113 Id. at 557–58. 
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decisions, whether that be the pursuit of nuclear energy or the research of 
solar geoengineering. 
There are also administrative hurdles to contend with. Through 
guidance, NOAA has established CXs that could readily be applied to the 
stratospheric research program mandated by Congress.114 Agencies develop 
CXs for application to frequent agency actions that do not merit 
environmental review because they have no or low impact on the physical 
environment. Applying a CX obviates the need to do further NEPA analysis 
in the form of an EA or EIS. A CX is available for NOAA computer 
modeling, data analysis, and project development for research activities.115 
Another CX would cover in-person or electronic remote observation of 
natural phenomena, such as atmospheric data collection from weather 
balloons.116 A third CX could be applied to “invasive [research] techniques,” 
so long as they comply with federal environmental protection laws, occur on 
a small scale, and have “no long-term adverse ecosystem impacts.”117 The 
examples given for this third CX imply it is geared toward minimally 
invasive research of living resources, like fish tagging and small-scale 
sampling.118 Its language, however, would cover the negligible atmospheric 
aerosol release of an experiment like SCoPEx, representing the outer bound 
of the potential impact of near-term research.119 
B. Opportunities for NEPA Review 
The legal structure described above outlines the circumstances that 
compel NEPA review and the minimum requirements of that analysis. 
Federal agencies, however, may go beyond NEPA’s statutory minimum, 
especially in light of extraordinary or highly controversial proposals. Solar 
geoengineering research calls for just that. 
The same NOAA guidance that establishes CXs under NEPA counsels 
that more in-depth analysis may be warranted in “extraordinary 
circumstances,” such as activities with “highly controversial environmental 
effects.”120 CEQ implementing regulations for NEPA recognize a similar 
exception: “An agency may . . . prepare environmental assessments” for 
 
 114 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & U.S. DEP’T OF COM., POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND RELATED AUTHORITIES app. 
E at E-7–E-9, reference nos. E1, E3, E5 (2017) [hereinafter NOAA & U.S. DEP’T OF COM.]. 
 115 See id. app. E at E-7–E-8, reference no. E1 
 116 See id. app. E at E-8–E-9, reference no. E3. 
 117 See id. app. E at E-9, reference no. E5. 
 118 See id. app. E at E-9–E-10, reference no. E5. 
 119 SCoPEx is used for analytic purposes. NOAA Research has announced no similar outdoor 
experiments in connection to this program. 
 120 Id. at 4–5. 
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some actions otherwise eligible for CXs in light of “extraordinary 
circumstances.”121 The word may is permissive; the agency is under no 
obligation to do an EA where a CX is sufficient.122 But agencies retain the 
authority to conduct a more expansive environmental review where they 
believe it prudent.123 Congress’s instruction to assess climate interventions is 
certainly extraordinary: the program is unusual, contrary to prevailing 
environmental norms, and essentially unprecedented among national 
governments.124 Solar geoengineering research is also extremely 
controversial, despite the minimal impacts that planned and foreseeable 
research activities would have for the physical environment.125 It would 
therefore be within NOAA’s discretion to launch a PEA on the first federal 
research program into solar climate interventions.126 
The PEA could consider the relationship between federally controlled 
research, federally funded research, and purely private research subject to 
federal permitting, such as SCoPEx and its peers. Specific research activities 
covered could include modeling, atmospheric observations, and minimally 
intrusive field experiments to collect data or aid in technology design. The 
 
 121 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010), rescinded and replaced by Update to the Regulations 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 
(July 16, 2020). CEQ’s recently finalized replacement regulations similarly allow agencies to conduct 
EAs where a CX is available in light of extraordinary circumstances. See Update to the Regulations 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 
43,322–23 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4). 
 122 See id. at 43,322–23. 
 123 Courts tend to narrowly interpret NEPA’s “controversy” factor as requiring scientific uncertainty 
or disagreement over a proposal’s physical impacts rather than political opposition or social unrest 
regarding a proposal. See Emily M. Slaten, Note, “We Don’t Fish in Their Oil Wells, and They Shouldn’t 
Drill in Our Rivers”: Considering Public Opposition Under NEPA and the Highly Controversial 
Regulatory Factor, 43 IND. L. REV. 1319, 1328–29 (2010); see also William Murray Tabb, The Role of 
Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 188–90 (1997) (arguing courts are 
inconsistent vis-à-vis “controversy” but tend to defer to agency determinations on that point). 
 124 See Extraordinary, 5  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 614 (2d ed. 1989). 
 125 See Carola Braun, Christine Merk, Gert Pönitzsch, Katrin Rehdanz & Ulrich Schmidt, Public 
Perception of Climate Engineering and Carbon Capture and Storage in Germany: Survey Evidence, 
18 CLIMATE POL’Y 471, 473, 475 (2017); Malcolm J. Wright, Damon A. H. Teagle & Pamela M. 
Feetham, A Quantitative Evaluation of the Public Response to Climate Engineering, 4 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 106, 107 tbl.1, 109 fig.2 (2014). 
 126 See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,364 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4); NOAA & DEP’T 
OF COM., supra note 114, at 8. Separate CEQ guidance advises programmatic review can take the form 
of either an EA or EIS. See Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 12. The Boots memo 
interprets the now-repealed NEPA implementing regulations, but CEQ finalized essentially the same 
language in the corresponding section of the replacement rules. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (repealed 
on September 13, 2020), with 85 Fed. Reg. 43,364 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4) (current 
regulations). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
260 
PEA, however, should exclude activities with a lasting, large, or widespread 
effect on climate or otherwise resulting in significant physical impacts.127 
Research with greater impacts would trigger a more intensive environmental 
review, and they are well beyond the scope of likely near-term research 
programs.128 Once complete, the PEA could then be incorporated by 
reference when NOAA Research applies CXs to individual experiments and 
research projects. Other research agencies or agencies involved in the 
permitting of private solar geoengineering research, such as the FAA, could 
also rely on the PEA when invoking their own CXs. 
NOAA seems a good fit to lead this review—in consultation with the 
FAA, EPA, and other agencies—given its duties to research earth systems, 
protect marine environments, and manage living resources. Some lawmakers 
agree on this point. A bill introduced in the U.S. House would expand 
NOAA’s formal authority to receive reports and give recommendations on 
solar geoengineering field research, though it would still lack permitting 
authority over such activities.129 There would also be precedent within 
NOAA for such a PEA. NOAA has completed PEAs for marine turtle 
research and coastal hydrographic survey programs, though they lacked 
significant direct impacts on the physical environment.130 What the agency 
has done before, it can do again. 
 
 127 Cf. Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, Research Governance, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND 
THE LAW 269, 294 fig.6.1 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018) (grouping solar geoengineering 
research activities into phases based on scale and purpose). 
 128 See id. 
 129 See Atmospheric Climate Intervention Research Act, H.R. 5519, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019) 
(proposing to amend NOAA Research’s organic statute, 33 U.S.C. § 893, to expressly cover solar 
geoengineering research activities and to clarify the agency’s advisory role on private sector weather 
modification activities under the Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1972). The Weather 
Modification Reporting Act requires any private person to submit a report to the Secretary of Commerce 
on “any weather modification activity,” see 15 U.S.C. § 330a, defined as “any activity performed with 
the intention of producing artificial changes in the composition, behavior, or dynamics of the 
atmosphere.” 15 U.S.C. § 330. The Secretary later delegated this responsibility to NOAA Research. 
NOAA’s implementing regulations clarify that this reporting requirement applies to solar geoengineering 
activities. See 15 C.F.R. § 908.3(a)(3) (“[W]eather modification activities . . . subject to reporting 
[include] . . . “[m]odifying the solar radiation exchange of the earth or clouds, through the release of 
gases, dusts, liquids, or aerosols into the atmosphere.”). NOAA may notify local authorities or issue 
recommendations in response to such reporting, but “[n]otification or recommendation, or failure to notify 
or recommend, shall not be construed as approval or disapproval of a proposed project.” 15 C.F.R. 
§ 908.12(d) (emphasis added); see also id. (describing the agency’s order as “advisory”). H.R. 5519 thus 
would formally recognize NOAA Research’s advisory role in private solar geoengineering research 
proposals but would not give it authority to regulate by permit. 
 130 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & PAC. ISLANDS 
FISHERIES SCI. CTR., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MARINE TURTLE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM (MTRP) AT THE PACIFIC ISLAND FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER (PIFSC), PROTECTED 
SPECIES DIVISION (PSD) 2 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.]; OFF. OF 
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The PEA process could begin by publishing a request for public 
comment for scoping the proposed research and the concerns that 
environmental review should address.131 This would allow for experts and 
the interested public to weigh in on the agency’s initial research plan. Once 
scoping is complete, the agency could evaluate the risks associated with 
different research plans and potential methods to limit those risks. To address 
slippery slope concerns, for example, NOAA Research could articulate 
limits to the research objectives and activities. The PEA could also give some 
consideration to the more abstract risks associated with an early research 
program, such as moral hazard. It may also consider the more abstract risks 
of not doing research, namely, a warmer world facing mounting climate 
harms but lacking experience with SAI research and governance. 
The NEPA process would also be an opportunity to engage with the 
public. It would provide for public comment and public hearings, with 
remarks noted and responded to within the PEA.132 The NEPA process would 
give NOAA Research a chance to contextualize the program, describe its 
negligible physical impacts, and correct possible misconceptions about solar 
geoengineering.133 Finally, NOAA Research could give assurances that 
research will not slip into SAI technology development or deployment—
perhaps by making such promises in the Record of Decision produced at the 
close of the NEPA process. Such commitments would be binding: courts can 
enforce mitigation and control measures announced in the Records of 
Decision.134 NEPA, of course, does not compel any mitigation or control 
measures. The agency would decide how much responsibility to take on. But 
the option is available to make binding commitments to the public if the 
agency wishes to do so. 
IV. WHY GOVERN? 
This expansive approach to NEPA may strike some as counterintuitive. 
NEPA can be a burdensome exercise in low-quality information 
 
COAST SURVEY, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF COAST SURVEY HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY PROJECTS 8–9 (2013). 
 131 Scoping is the process of identifying and defining issues requiring environmental analysis. See 
40 C.F.R. § 1501.9 (effective Sept. 14, 2020). 
 132 See Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (“Through the disclosure of 
an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency has taken environmental considerations into account.”). 
 133 See Charles R. Corbett, Chemtrails and Solar Geoengineers: Governing Online Conspiracy 
Theory Misinformation, 85 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author) 
(describing pervasive misinformation online about solar geoengineering); see also Dustin Tingley & 
Gernot Wagner, Solar Geoengineering and the Chemtrails Conspiracy on Social Media, 3 PALGRAVE 
COMMC’NS 1, 1–2 (2017). 
 134 See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,037 (Mar. 23, 1981). 
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production.135 Its laboriousness incentivizes agencies to minimize or 
downplay environmental impacts to avoid triggering in-depth environmental 
assessments.136 Judicial review can also greatly add to the agency’s 
administrative burden; NEPA processes frequently give rise to 
environmental litigation against agency decision-making.137 Given these 
considerations, agency officials may wonder why an agency would ever 
volunteer for a more comprehensive NEPA review. 
There are three reasons why. First, NEPA’s public participation 
components and procedural rigor would bolster the project’s legitimacy. 
Second, it may improve the research agenda and governance, while also 
giving complimentary climate policy processes time to come to fruition. 
Third, it would serve as a valuable opportunity for the agency to provide 
global leadership on solar geoengineering governance at a relatively low 
administrative cost. 
A. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy describes a valid or rightful use of power by a governing 
authority.138 Roughly speaking, a government action can be found legitimate 
where it is lawful, justified, and socially accepted.139 Within liberal 
democracies, legitimacy often “invokes . . . values including responsiveness, 
transparency, participation, deliberation[,] and [public] engagement.”140 
Such societies often enact those democratic values by incorporating robust 
public participation mechanisms in government decision-making.141 It 
follows that robust public participation mechanisms can also bolster the 
legitimacy of federal solar geoengineering research.142 Of course, there are 
other sources of legitimacy—the administrative state, in particular, can claim 
 
 135 See Karkkainen, supra note 93, at 917. 
 136 See id. at 936; COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FACT SHEET: CEQ’S 
PROPOSAL TO MODERNIZE ITS NEPA IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 1 (2020). 
 137 See, e.g., AUDREY BIXLER, R. PATRICK BIXLER, AUTUMN ELLISON & CASSANDRA MOSELEY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEPA DECISIONS: RISK FACTORS AND RISK MINIMIZING 
STRATEGIES FOR THE FOREST SERVICE 16–19 (2016) (reviewing literature describing NEPA cases 
brought against the U.S. Forest Service). 
 138 See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 215, 
216–17 (2010) (arguing legitimacy at minimum encompasses “the right to rule”). 
 139 See Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global Governance, 
18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 17, 20–21, 42 (2011). 
 140 Id. at 22. 
 141 See id. But see Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (describing this attitude toward 
public participation in administrative law as a “fetish”). 
 142 See Jane A. Flegal, Anna-Maria Hubert, David R. Morrow & Juan B. Moreno-Cruz, Solar 
Geoengineering: Social Science, Legal, Ethical, and Economic Frameworks, 44 ANN. REV. ENV’T & 
RES. 399, 404–06 (2019). 
115:240 (2021) Federal Research of Solar Geoengineering Under NEPA 
263 
the right to govern via reasonable, lawful expert decision-making.143 But a 
claim to legitimacy can be derived from multiple sources at once.144 With an 
endeavor as controversial and troubling as solar geoengineering, NOAA and 
the federal government would do well to make as strong a case as they can.145 
The NEPA process would allow NOAA meaningful public engagement 
in research activities. At a basic level, the public engagement process is a 
chance for agencies to inform and educate people on projects that may affect 
them.146 These members of the public are stakeholders as they “have an 
interest or stake in an issue, such as individuals, interest groups, [or] 
communities.”147 Once informed, the public can then weigh in on the 
proposal, potentially influencing the agency’s decision-making.148 
Of course, public engagement does not necessarily mean public control. 
An agency can scale the level of public participation depending on a project’s 
potential impacts and the discretion it has over implementation.149 Lower risk 
and fewer discretion cuts in favor of less public inclusion. Greater risk and 
more open-ended program needs, however, could be reasons for greater 
collaboration with stakeholders. At the low end of public engagement, the 
agency could limit itself to merely informing the public of the nature of the 
project without giving members of the public an opportunity to comment.150 
At the high end, the agency could delegate final decision-making authority 
to the public by ballot or proxy vote.151 
The amount of public engagement needed for initial federal research of 
solar geoengineering lies somewhere between these extremes. Specifically, 
NOAA should engage in a consultation process with the interested public 
that informs them of the nature and bounds of its stratospheric aerosol 
 
 143 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470–72, 553–56 (2003). 
 144 See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 23, 42. 
 145 See SHUCHI TALATI & PETER C. FRUMHOFF, STRENGTHENING PUBLIC INPUT ON SOLAR 
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH 3–4 (2020); see also Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction, in CLIMATE 
ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 1, 25–26 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018) (outlining a 
governance structure that could bolster legitimacy of research). 
 146 See Adrien Abecassis, Charles R. Corbett, Benjamin Harris, Edward A. Parson & Jesse L. 
Reynolds, Comment on the Proposed Governance Framework for Harvard University’s Stratospheric 
Controlled Perturbation Experiment (“SCoPEx”) by the SCoPEx Advisory Committee. 2 (July 31, 2020), 
https://legal-planet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SCoPEx-comment-letter-31Jul2020-Submitted.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68F5-6NQB] [hereinafter Comment Letter]. 
 147 EPA, INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION TOOLKIT 3, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/ppg_english_full-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VYB-PHDM]. 
 148 Comment Letter, supra note 146, at 2. 
 149 EPA, supra note 147, at 12–16. 
 150 Id. at 14. 
 151 Id. at 15. 
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research, invites comment, reviews, faithfully deliberates on the issues 
raised, and meaningfully responds.152 A meaningful response could include 
revising the program’s design or controls, depending on the agency’s 
resources, objectives, and flexibility. Critically, it would also give NOAA an 
opportunity to inform the public on what the research is not. A significant 
portion of public discourse on solar geoengineering is distorted by 
conspiracy theory misinformation.153 A public engagement process with a 
robust education component could inoculate some members of the public 
against misinformation on the subject.154 
The NEPA process is well equipped to facilitate such a public 
consultation—perhaps uniquely so. NEPA requires agencies to publicly 
share information and analysis on environmentally significant proposals. It 
creates an opportunity for public comment, and the agency is obliged to 
review, summarize, and respond to those comments. Though agencies need 
not act on the issues raised, NEPA provides opportunity and incentive to 
correct course, thus making project improvement more likely. Finally, the 
process is subject to a well-developed body of case law and an expansive set 
of implementing regulations.155 These legal authorities would give the 
environmental review process the concreteness and heft that a completely 
voluntary, nonstatutory public engagement process would lack. An 
environmental assessment under the auspices of federal law simply has a 
stronger claim to legitimacy than one occurring via an informal, ad hoc, or 
completely voluntary process.156 
Another element of legitimacy is lawfulness: a legitimate agency action 
complies with the requirements of the law in good faith.157 Here, full and 
faithful satisfaction of NEPA militates in favor of providing at least some 
risk analysis. Congress’s appropriation to NOAA Research is genuinely 
extraordinary, and NEPA urges agencies to thoughtfully consider ex ante the 
potential environmental consequences of extraordinary or controversial 
proposals. Moreover, the potential risks at hand with solar geoengineering 
 
 152 See Comment Letter, supra note 146, at 6–7 (citing EPA, supra note 147, at 14). 
 153 See Corbett, supra note 133, at 13. 
 154 See id. at 9. 
 155 See Spensley, supra note 74, at 682–90. 
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Nonstate Governance of Solar Geoengineering Research, 160 CLIMATIC CHANGE 323, 336 (2020). The 
argument here is that federal agencies have an independent claim to legitimacy by virtue of being a lawful 
part of the government. Moreover, agencies can simultaneously bolster their authority by demonstrating 
many of the same qualities and values that lend legitimacy to nonstate governance processes. 
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research are profoundly significant, if indirect and diffuse. Invoking a CX in 
these circumstances, and nothing more, would be inappropriate. 
B. A Better Research Agenda 
More expansive NEPA review—one that goes beyond what the statute 
and the implementing regulations strictly require—may also improve the 
research agenda and its governance. There is a small but energetic 
community of scientific and governance experts working on issues raised by 
the prospect of solar geoengineering.158 The agency should avail itself in a 
public comment period to the resources and expertise of these research 
communities, as NEPA would require. Doing so publicly via an open process 
would communicate and publicize the fact that this expert consultation is 
taking place, potentially bolstering public confidence in the program. 
Separately, it would allow experts to weigh in who were overlooked during 
informal agency consultation processes. Input from experts who have views 
contrary to stakeholders advocating for research would be particularly 
valuable. A public process can also improve the quality of input given by 
experts, as publication provides an incentive to sharpen, temper, and 
substantiate advice. Informal consultation processes, meanwhile, would 
remain available to elicit advice that experts may not wish to state publicly. 
Comment from nonexperts and laypeople may also improve the quality 
of the research agenda.159 The public, by virtue of its size and diversity, 
possesses knowledge and experiences the agency does not. Laypeople hence 
can provide new insights and identify weak points that government officials 
and experts may overlook. At a minimum, they can educate the agency on 
public preferences about the project.160 
A public engagement period would also give a few complementary 
climate policy processes time to come to fruition. The National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NAS) is finalizing a report on 
research priorities and governance recommendations for solar 
geoengineering.161 NAS recently produced an authoritative report on a 
research agenda on negative emissions technologies that has oriented 
 
 158 See IPCC, supra note 3, at 349–52 cross-ch. box 10 (summarizing findings of this scholarship). 
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 160 See id. at 186. 
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research, development, and demonstration efforts in the field.162 It is widely 
believed that NAS’s report on solar geoengineering will prove similarly 
authoritative.163 Investing time in a public engagement process would allow 
the Academy to complete its report. The agency could then incorporate 
NAS’s findings into its final PEA and research plan. 
Developing a PEA would also give the rest of the federal government 
time to commit to more vigorous climate mitigation and adaptation policies. 
President Biden has recently announced a suite of ambitious directives and 
initiatives on climate.164 Solar geoengineering is no substitute for 
comprehensive climate policy. Proceeding with climate engineering research 
now, after President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement and repealed 
many climate regulations,165 risks sending the dangerous message that SAI 
can replace or run ahead of deep emissions cuts. It would therefore be 
prudent to give the federal government time to begin realizing its climate 
strategy.166 In this regard, NEPA’s time investment would be another tool for 
improving the program’s robustness. 
C. Model Governance at a Low Cost 
Lastly, the final PEA and the public engagement process that created it 
would be valuable work products in themselves. The United States is 
breaking new ground with this research program. The final PEA could serve 
as a model governance document for other governments or institutions to 
consider when developing their own research priorities. For instance, the 
PEA could collect and digest resources on the environmental and social risks 
of solar geoengineering as well as the governance methods for limiting those 
risks. It could provide an opportunity for a clear, public articulation of the 
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program’s purpose, which allows the agency to contextualize its research 
within overarching climate policy efforts. Private research entities and 
nonprofits are trying to launch similar public engagement processes,167 but it 
is a job far better suited for the federal government. The administrative 
burden of the PEA would be small. NEPA can be unduly burdensome, but 
those critiques are raised in response to far more intensive environmental 
reviews analyzing significant physical impacts. It is highly unlikely that 
NOAA Research’s PEA will uncover significant environmental impacts 
giving rise to the need for an extensive and expensive EIS. Similar PEAs that 
NOAA has completed were short by NEPA standards.168 It is also unlikely 
that completing a PEA here would increase the agency’s existing risk of 
litigation. Many stakeholders are deeply opposed to any solar 
geoengineering research.169 NOAA Research faces risk of litigation 
regardless of how it decides to proceed under NEPA. Completing a PEA on 
its own initiative would communicate a good faith effort to comply with the 
statute’s requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change affects everyone, and so does the prospect of solar 
geoengineering. The public deserves an opportunity to weigh in on the matter 
and be apprised of the significant environmental, social, and political risks 
of research. It is doubtful that these interests and concerns alone would be 
sufficient to compel environmental review under NEPA. Nonetheless, the 
federal government must take responsibility for its solar geoengineering 
research and govern it effectively. NOAA should not pass up this opportunity 
to demonstrate real leadership on climate policy. 
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